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Asif Durrani //DAWN: May 3, 2025
AFTER conducting three rounds of talks, which began on April 12, a fourth round between the US and Iran slated for today (May 3) in Rome has been postponed, presumably by Tehran because of the fresh US sanctions on its oil exports. Separately, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth warned Iran that it would face consequences for supporting the Houthis, who have attacked ships in the Red Sea in solidarity with the Palestinians. It is becoming clear that Iran would be reluctant to continue talks if the US side continues to put pressure on Iran and hurl threats of further punitive action — something the Iranian clergy is loath to accept.
The recent diplomatic engagements between Iran and the US sparked cautious optimismabout breaking the decades-long stalemate that has characterised their relationship since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Both sides spoke positively about the conduct of negotiations, even though there were speculations about the outcome of the talks until tangible progress was achieved. President Donald Trump’s threat of bombing Iran cast a long shadow over the process, underlining the high stakes involved.
How soon the two countries resume talks is a matter of speculation. Suspicions between them run deep, and the talks are expected to encounter hurdles once discussions move from broad diplomatic niceties to the finer, more contentious details. Right now, Iran’s strategic vulnerability due to setbacks in Syria, Lebanon and Gaza has emboldened Israel, and the US is likely to prioritise Israel’s security interests.
America’s ‘maximum pressure’ strategy towards Iran seems to be an effort to achieve several aims.
On the military front, opinions are divided over Iran’s capabilities. The recent exchange of missiles between Iran and Israel exposed weaknesses in Iran’s missile defence systems, which failed to neutralise Israeli strikes effectively. Furthermore, maintaining an extensive network of proxies across the Middle East has proven financially and strategically burdensome for Iran.
In addition to ongoing military operations in Gaza, Israel has continued to assert control over Syrian territory in the Golan Heights. In Iraq, despite a Shia-majority population, a resurgence of Arab nationalism — encouraged by Saudi Arabia and the UAE — has gradually eroded Iranian influence. Adding to Iran’s regional challenges, Saudi Arabia is reportedly contemplating repaying Syria’s $15 million debt to the World Bank, potentially positioning itself as a benefactor in Syria’s reconstruction efforts. This move may further isolate Iran diplomatically and economically.
The Trump administration’s ‘maximum pressure’ strategy towards Iran appears to be a calculated effort to achieve several objectives. Foremost among these is the complete denuclearisation of Iran, which, if successful, would consolidate Israel’s military superiority and establish its regional hegemony. For the US, the presence of enriched uranium in Iran represents a critical security concern.
However, achieving denuclearisation is no simple feat. A major sticking point is whether Iran agrees to transfer its stockpile of highly enriched uranium to a third country or insists on retaining it under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The resolution of this issue will be pivotal to the success or failure of the ongoing talks. A continued impasse will likely expose Iran to increasing pressure from not only the US but also its European allies, who have grown wary of Tehran’s regional behaviour and nuclear posture.
Another looming threat is the possibility of regime change, a recurring theme in the American foreign policy discourse regarding Iran. Meanwhile, exiled opposition figures such as Reza Pahlavi have been reported to be in close contact with US and Israeli officials, raising concerns within the Iranian establishment about foreign-backed attempts to destabilise the regime.
To sustain pressure, the Trump administration may consider tightening sanctions further, potentially targeting Iranian oil exports. Such a move, however, risks escalating tensions and may provoke a fierce Iranian response. Depending on how Iran’s leadership, particularly the clerical establishment, chooses to react, several retaliatory measures could be on the table:
Declaration as a nuclear weapons state: Iran could publicly announce its acquisition of nuclear weapons. However, US intelligence assessments remain divided on whether Iran has crossed that threshold. Moreover, Iran’s nuclear programme has historically faced serious obstacles — including the assassination of top scientists and internal sabotage — making this path both risky and uncertain.
Closure of the Strait of Hormuz: Iran can disrupt global oil shipments by closing this strategic chokepoint. While recent rapprochement with the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, may act as a restraining factor, deep-seated mistrust persists in the region.
Leverage of strategic partnerships: Iran’s growing ties with Russia and China have added a new dimension to the geopolitical equation. These relationships may serve as a deterrent against any unilateral military action by the US, forcing Washington to consider broader international repercussions before acting.
The escalating tensions between the US and Iran carry profound implications for Pakistan, which must tread carefully to protect its national interests. Historically, Pakistan has maintained a complex relationship with the US, which is marked by cooperation but also episodes of betrayal. Though designated a major non-Nato ally, Pakistan has often found itself sidelined in favour of American strategic interests in India, which have proven detrimental to Islamabad’s regional objectives.
In contrast, Iran is not only a neighbouring country but also shares deep cultural and religious ties with Pakistan. While differences in perception have existed, the two have no fundamental territorial or political dispute. Therefore, Pakistan must adopt a nuanced, region-first approach if the Iran-US stand-off intensifies. A balanced foreign policy focused on regional stability and cooperation is essential for Pakistan to navigate the complex and potentially explosive geopolitical landscape that lies ahead.
The writer is a former special representative of Pakistan for Afghanistan. He served as Pakistan’s ambassador to Iran and the UAE. Currently, he is the Senior Research Fellow at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute.
durraniasif2@gmail.com
Published in Dawn, May 3rd, 2025
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DAWN EDITORIAL: 03 May 2025
WORLD Press Freedom Day has arrived under a dark cloud, with journalism in dire straits across the globe. According to Reporters Without Borders, 2025 marks the first time that journalism is rated “poor” in half the world’s countries — an unprecedented low in global press freedom. South Asia reflects this troubling trend vividly: Pakistan ranks 158th out of 180, India 151st, and Bangladesh 149th — all classified as having “very serious” constraints on media.
In Pakistan, the pressure is acute. Legal repression continues to intensify. The 2025 amendment to the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act criminalises “false information” that causes fear or unrest — a vague provision widely seen as a tool to muzzle dissent. Journalists have protested this law nationwide, calling it a blow to constitutional protections of free speech. Meanwhile, physical threats remain ever-present. According to Freedom Network, Pakistan recorded at least five journalist killings between May 2024 and April this year. Internet shutdowns and social media blackouts — such as those imposed after political unrest in 2023 — continue to be deployed to stifle access to information.
Adding to these pressures is the severe economic decline facing independent media. With slowing revenues and rising costs, independent reporting has been under siege because of selective doling out of government advertisements, which are used to reward and punish media houses. RSF warns that without financial independence, editorial integrity cannot survive, and without that, the public loses its access to truthful reporting.
The global picture is no less grim. In the US, ranked 57th, press freedom is eroding under economic and political pressures. Journalists are contending with media layoffs, newsroom closures, and in some cases, police overreach — as seen in the Marion County Record raid. The second Trump administration has intensified hostility towards the press, slashing media funding and booting out critical outlets from the White House press pool. In Israel, ranked 112th, the Gaza conflict has had devastating consequences for journalists. Over 200 media workers have been killed in 18 months, and newsrooms destroyed, leading RSF to comment at one point: “At the rate journalists are being killed in Gaza, there will soon be no one left to keep you informed.”
As 2025 marks a global reckoning for press freedom, one truth stands out: no country is immune. Developing countries demonstrate how repression, violence and legal harassment can cripple journalism. But even so-called established democracies like the US are backsliding. The threats may differ, but the impulse to control narratives is universal. Defending press freedom now demands more than rhetoric; it requires legal protections, independent institutions and a public that refuses to accept silence. Journalism is democracy’s first line of defence, and it must endure.
Published in Dawn, May 3rd, 2025
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Rafia Zakaria Published May 3, 2025
[This article is recommended for those who want to write something on the women's rights in Pakistan]
RECENTLY, I wrote about a landmark case decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan: a woman named Zahida Parveen had appealed a lower court decision which held that benefits accrued to unmarried daughters through their father’s government service did not transfer to married daughters. The SC struck down the lower court ruling and the premise that “married women are the responsibility of their husbands”. Zahida Parveen would have been able to continue in her position as a schoolteacher in Karak, KP — a post once held by her deceased father.
A similar case involving similar issues emerged in the Sindh High Court (SHC) The petitioner, Sarwat Ghazi Uddin, approached the court because the provincial authorities had denied her the pension of her late father. Her father had been an assistant professor at the College Education Department in Sindh prior to his death in January 2023. The petitioner argued that she and her unmarried sister were entitled to their deceased father’s pension. The issue at hand was whether a divorced woman had the same rights as an unmarried daughter under the pension regulations.
In its decision, the SHC went into the history of pension regulations in the province and noted that in 1983, the rules were liberalised to include widowed and divorced daughters among those who could inherit pensions after a father’s death. This was done through an office memorandum amending the 1977 pension rules. It was noted that pension was the right of the bereaved family and that widowed daughters could by no stretch of the imagination be categorised differently from unmarried daughters.
The decision, penned by Justice Nisar Ahmed Bhanbro, is a welcome one. There is no justification for treating widowed, divorced or unmarried daughters differently, as the rationale for inclusion is the same: these women were dependent on their father at the time of his death, and should therefore continue receiving financial support in the form of his government pension. Greater awareness of the 1983 amendment will hopefully prompt other institutions to follow the court’s interpretation and no longer deny claims by divorced or widowed daughters to their father’s pension.
Like men, women must inherit the benefits regardless of marital status.
It is also worth considering the SHC’s decision vis-à-vis the SC’s ruling in the Zahida Parveen case, where the petitioner was neither unmarried, widowed, nor divorced, but still successfully claimed her father’s government position. In the SC case, Justice Mansoor Ali Shah objected to the notion that once a woman is married, she becomes the financial responsibility of her husband. The court held that women must be considered individual legal and financial entities.
If the apex court’s reasoning in Zahida Parveen’s case is to be considered determinative and an indication of the rationale that the court has adopted with regard to women’s financial independence and their rights to inheritance, then the decision in Sarwat Ghazi Uddin’s case could be extended to married daughters as well. This is particularly valuable for women’s rights, as both the inheritance of a job and access to a pension allow them greater financial independence.
Many may overlook these small wins, nestled deep in the texts of court decisions, but these are just the steps that lead to the actual empowerment of ordinary Pakistani women trying to survive in a hostile world. Male family members inherit pensions and jobs regardless of marital status so it follows that woman — who are under the Constitution equal to men — should also be able to inherit any and all benefits regardless of their marital status. While the facts of the case in the SHC may not permit a decision that would state this beyond what the petitioner had asked the court, one hopes to hear about similar cases filed by married women who wants to inherit their fathers’ pension.
That set of facts would allow for the decision made by the apex court to be considered vis-à-vis the rules of inheriting pensions in Sindh. If there are possible petitioners facing such a situation who are reading this, the time to file your case is right now.
Financial independence is crucial for all women and the bedrock of their uplift and empowerment. The SHC should be commended for the role that it has played in ensuring that divorcees and widows, who are most often denied benefits and mistreated by society, get justice.
This is an important step towards the recognition of women as separate enti-ties regardless of their marital status and will undoubtedly help thousands of women in a situation similar to Sarwat Ghazi Uddin.
The writer is an attorney teaching constitutional law and political philosophy.
rafia.zakaria@gmail.com
Published in Dawn, May 3rd, 2025
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Amber Darr //DAWN: May 3, 2025
[General knowledge about cartels and laws against caterlisation]
IN March this year, the Competition Commission of Pakistan issued an emphatic statement that it would take ‘strict action’ against ‘cartelisation’ in the sugar industry.
This was neither unusual, nor the first against the industry. Since commencing operations in 2007, the CCP has issued several orders punishing cartels in different sectors of the Pakistani economy. In fact, in 2021, it had found a cartel in the sugar industry and had imposed an aggregate penalty of Rs44 billion on the Pakistan Sugar Mills Association and 81 of its member sugar mills.
But what exactly are cartels? For the history buff, the mention of a cartel may evoke recollections of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and its 1973 oil embargo against selling oil to the US.
A cinephile, however, might conjure images of Pablo Escobar running a drug cartel in Colombia and terrifying Colombian citizens and law-enforcement authorities alike. While both these scenarios are versions of cartels, the ones that the CCP goes after are more prosaic, more rampant, and, most importantly, more damaging to the Pakistani economy and the Pakistani consumer.
In simple terms, a cartel is an agreement. It means that sellers of a product, who should ordinarily be competing with each other for our business, instead join hands. For instance, they may agree to charge the same price for their products throughout the market, or they may agree to allocate regions among themselves so that they can all get a share of the market, or agree to only produce specific quantities so that they can charge a higher price for these products. The common factor in all such agreements is that they are designed to profit the sellers rather than the consumer or the economy.
While the CCP has certainly exercised its power to impose necessary fines on cartels, it has had much less luck in recovering them.
The harm that we, the consumers, suffer from such agreements is self-evident. For instance, we have no possibility of getting a better price for the product we need. Whether it is a bag of cement or fertiliser that we need, we will be faced by the same higher price wherever we go. This not only limits our choices in the market but also leaves less money in our pockets to buy other things we may require. In economic terms, this means that money from the consumer is transferred to the seller and while his profits have increased, our surplus or welfare has declined.
It is tempting to argue that though cartels may harm consumers, they are good for the economy because they allow sellers to make more money. However, this argument is flawed. Without the pressure to compete, members of cartels have no incentive to innovate to improve their products or their processes. In producing less than they can, they waste already limited economic resources. They also make it difficult for new entrants that are not members of the cartel to enter the market. Worse of all, they undermine trust in the economy. In time, this not only erodes investor confidence, it also stunts economic growth.
It is for these reasons that competition authorities around the world are particularly strict with cartels. For instance, the European competition regime, on which the Pakistani regime is based, declares that once the competition authority has discovered the existence of an agreement — whether or not it has been formally executed — which fixes prices, allocates markets, fixes quotas, etc, it will declare it illegal and punish all those who participated in it. It does not require any proof of the actual effect of the agreement on competition in the market and does not accept any defences that cartel members may raise.
However, the difficulty is that cartels are notoriously difficult to detect. People or companies seeking to enter an illegal and economically damaging arrangement are not likely to write these down or leave an evidence trail. Detection becomes nearly impossible in the digital economy, which can achieve consensus through algorithms.
Competition authorities have, therefore, introduced leniency regimes. These encourage whistleblowers to come forward on the promise that if they provide relevant information, they may reduce, if not entirely avoid, heavy cartel penalties.
Cartel investigations in Pakistan have often centred around trade associations, including associations representing newspapers, cement manufacturers, LPG importers, travel agents, poultry growers, jute, vanaspati, flour and sugar mill owners, ship’s agents, and authorised dealers of automobile manufacturers. Although associations have historically been formed to address legitimate industry-wide concerns or share best practices, the CCP has often found that companies have used the readymade association platform to engage in cartel activities.
Under the Competition Act, the CCP has the power to fine cartels in the sum of Rs75 million, or 10 per cent of the company’s annual turnover, as it deems fit. While the CCP has certainly exercised this power to impose necessary fines on cartels, it has had much less luck in recovering them.
Aggrieved companies have not only challenged CCP’s orders, but also its constitutionality and power to ask for information. The CCP has also suffered due to the delay in establishing the Competition Appellate Tribunal, which is required by law to hear appeals on CCP’s orders before they can be heard by the Supreme Court.
However, a light emerged in CCP’s otherwise gloomy skies in October 2020, when Justice Ayesha Malik, then still at the Lahore High Court, upheld the constitutionality of the Competition Act. This light became brighter with Justice Jawad Hassan’s November 2024 order clarifying that CCP’s showcause notices cannot be challenged before the courts, and the Competition Appellate Tribunal’s April 2025 order confirming the CCP order fining the vanaspati association for anti-competitive activities.
We, as consumers, can only hope that the government and the courts continue to play their part in ensuring that the CCP’s efforts to deliver for us and the economy, remain on track.
The writer is a barrister, an advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and holds a PhD in law from University College London. She presently teaches competition law at the University of Manchester.
Published in Dawn, May 3rd, 2025
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