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Maleeha Lodhi Published April 28, 2025
INDIA and Pakistan are back on the brink of a dangerous confrontation. Escalating tensions have pushed the subcontinent into uncharted territory heightening the risk of a full-blown crisis as bilateral mechanisms are cast aside and diplomatic relations further downgraded.
Following a terrorist attack in Pahalgam in occupied Kashmir, which claimed the lives of 26 civilians, India announced a raft of punitive measures against Pakistan. They included suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), which governs the sharing and management of trans-border rivers between the two neighbours. Other steps involved closing the Attari border crossing, cancelling visas and shrinking the size of the Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi.
These so-called retaliatory steps were taken without any investigation into the terrorist incident and absent any evidence of Pakistan’s involvement. The Indian foreign secretary’s announcement only mentioned “cross-border linkages of the terrorist attack”. But an orchestrated campaign in the Indian media pointed the accusing finger at Pakistan.
More significantly, Prime Minister Narendra Modi warned of “unimaginable punishment” for the attackers and their backers. This intensified speculation in India that his government was planning some kind of kinetic action to avenge the killings. It recalled memories of the 2019 Balakot crisiswhen Indian planes crossed the border to launch strikes inside Pakistani territory ostensibly against militant hideouts. Pakistan retaliated by air strikes in Jammu. The crisis was defused with the help of friendly countries after Pakistan repatriated an Indian pilot captured when his plane was shot down by Pakistan.
Islamabad’s response to India’s April 23 announcement was carefully calibrated to match Indian moves. A statement issued after a meeting of the National Security Committeeannounced a slew of retaliatory actions. It described Indian measures as “unilateral, unjust and irresponsible”. It rejected the Indian decision to suspend the IWT and warned any attempt “to stop or divert the flow of water belonging to Pakistan” will be “considered an act of war and responded with full force”. Pakistan, it said, reserved the right to hold “all bilateral agreements with India”, including the Simla Agreement, “in abeyance” but stopped short of suspending any. Pakistan also shut down the Wagah border crossing and its airspace to Indian overflights as well as halted all trade. These steps mostly mirrored Indian actions.
Escalating tensions have pushed the region into uncharted territory and towards a full-blown crisis.
India’s announcement about putting the IWT “in abeyance” was not made in a vacuum. For the past several years New Delhi has been raising doubts about the fate of the 1960 treaty, that has for over six decades survived wars, confrontations and tensions to provide a framework for water-sharing.
The two countries disagreed in recent years over the treaty’s dispute settlement mechanism. India, for example, boycotted a court of arbitration hearing in January 2023 at The Hague on Indian hydroelectric projects on the Chenab and Jhelum rivers disputed by water-stressed Pakistan. It wanted a neutral expert instead. In January 2023, India notified Pakistan of its intention to amend the treaty’s dispute settlement provisions. Islamabad responded at the time by expressing willingness to discuss any concerns in the relevant body, the joint Indus Waters Commission, while calling on India to comply with the treaty.
In August 2024, New Delhi formally askedIslamabad for a review and renegotiation of the IWT. In its communication to Pakistan, India called for modifying it on grounds of what it called “fundamental and unforeseen change” in circumstances as well as security concerns. It mentioned concerns over issues including “demographic changes, environmental challenges, and the need to accelerate clean energy development”. India’s letter of April 24 to Pakistan echoed the same points but significantly added “sustained cross-border terrorism by Pakistan” as justification for putting the treaty in abeyance.
India’s decision to suspend the treaty is neither consistent with treaty provisions nor international law. The treaty does not allow either party to unilaterally put it in abeyance or abrogate it. Both parties have to consent to any treaty modification or its termination according to its provisions. India’s announcement says the IWT “will be held in abeyance with immediate effect until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism”.
For now, abeyance means India will cease sharing water flow data and exchanging information about project designs. But it already stopped doing that years ago. It can take other steps to mount pressure. But India cannot immediately halt the flow of water or significantly divert it as it lacks the infrastructure at present to do so. So, the near-term impact of this action will be limited. Of course, in the longer term it has serious implications.
The imminent danger is from any military action New Delhi is tempted to take, encouraged by what its officials see as ‘effective’ Indian coercive diplomacy in play, which needs reinforcement. Modi’s speech in Bihar on April 24 in which he said terrorists and their backers will be pursued to the “ends of the earth” is being widely construed as strong indication of that possibility. Speculation is running rife that conventional kinetic strikes may be combined with cyberattacks and asymmetrical actions by India.
Already deployment of heavy weaponry is reported close to the Line of Control and international border. Prime Minister Modi may think he can borrow from the Israeli playbook to ‘punish’ Pakistan but any Indian kinetic action will be met by a strong military response from Pakistan, with uncertain and unpredictable consequences for New Delhi. This will likely set off an escalatory cycle and trigger an all-out crisis, which could be on a larger scale than what happened in 2019.
In 2019, a third party helped to defuse the crisis. Will this happen again? If no such help is forthcoming in a timely way it would make the situation between two nuclear neighbours more dangerous than in the past.
The notion of limited war waged under the nuclear threshold is fraught with untold risks. Such a scenario should be avoided at all costs. Even though there is little appetite for this by the Indian side, a backchannel must be re-established without delay to avoid any miscalculation, manage the crisis and prevent it from spinning out of control. The alternative is too terrifying to contemplate.
The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN.
Published in Dawn, April 28th, 2025
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DAWN EDITORIAL: 28 April 2025
THE relevant authorities in Pakistan are often blamed for negligence and poor management when it comes to Haj arrangements — and not without reason. This time around, apparent bungling and finger-pointing may prevent around 67,000 Pakistani pilgrims from making the voyage to the holy land to carry out their religious duties. In fact, the prime minister recently held a meeting to discuss the crisis, promising to approach the Saudi government to resolve the issue, while expressing his displeasure with the religious affairs ministry over the debacle. The official Haj quota for Pakistani pilgrims — including those travelling through the government scheme and those going through private operators — is just over 179,000 individuals for the current year. But 67,000 of these intending hajis may not make the cut. Various reasons are being cited for the lapse. Some reports indicate that the private Haj organisers have failed to meet the Saudi government’s criteria, while the operators claim the problem lies with the Saudi authorities, whose system ‘crashed’, delaying payments. Other reports suggest that the money for Haj was sent to the wrong Saudi account.
A thorough, transparent probe is required to indicate what exactly went wrong, and to ensure it does not happen again. Moreover, the PM should request the Saudi government to allow all the pilgrims that have qualified to proceed for Haj. The fact is that mismanagement has plagued the organisation of the pilgrimage for years. In the past, a religious affairs minister, along with other senior officials, were convicted — later acquitted — in a Haj corruption case. Nearly every year, pilgrims complain of inadequate, substandard lodging and transport facilities, as well as hidden costs. The state needs to ensure that the whole Haj experience — from the application stage to the pilgrims’ return home — is a smooth and painless one. This sacred rite should not be spoiled due to bureaucratic bungling and the avarice of unscrupulous organisers.
Published in Dawn, April 28th, 2025
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India has signed a contract to purchase 26 Rafale fighter jets from France for its navy, New Delhi’s defence ministry said on Monday, with the multi-billion-dollar deal to include both single and twin-seat planes.
“We have signed the deal for 26 Rafale jets,” a spokesperson for India’s defence ministry told AFP.
When delivered, the jets would join 36 French-made Rafale fighters already acquired by New Delhi as part of its efforts to rapidly modernise its military hardware.
The Indian government first announced its intention to procure 26 Rafales in 2023, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited France for the Bastille Day celebrations.
The jets made by French aerospace company Dassault Aviation are expected to operate from Indian-made aircraft carriers, replacing the Russian MiG-29K jets.
“The Rafale-Marine is a carrier-borne combat-ready aircraft with proven operational capabilities in a maritime environment. The delivery of these aircraft would be completed by 2030, with the crew undergoing training in France and India,” the statement by the Indian Ministry of Defence said.
Indian media reports suggest that the deal would include training, equipment, weapons and other related logistical support for the Indian military.
Despite historical ties with Russia as its key supplier for military equipment, India has diversified with key purchases including from France as well as from the United States and Israel.
It also marks another step in India’s long-standing reliance on French military hardware, including Mirage 2000 jets bought in the 1980s and Scorpene-class submarines ordered in 2005.
Additional input from Reuters.
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Umair Javed | Max Gallien | Vanessa van den Boogard //DAWN: April 28, 2025
THE last few years have proven to be immensely difficult for low-income households in Pakistan. High rates of inflation and low economic growth have exacerbated poverty and heightened the importance of redistributive welfare mechanisms.
One such mechanism practised widely across Pakistan, and the Muslim world in general, is zakat. Zakat constitutes an annual payment amounting to approximately 2.5 per cent of wealth held by an individual and represents one of the five pillars of Islam. Most Muslims fulfil this obligation during the holy month of Ramazan. Despite its importance as a mechanism for redistribution, research on actual zakat payments and their effects remains limited. Since 2021, the authors of this piece, based at the International Centre of Tax and Development and the Lahore University of Management Sciences, have partnered to examine how zakat functions in practice and its effects on social equity and state-society relations.
As part of our research, we were able to carry out a new nationwide survey of 7,500 Pakistanis in 2024. The results from this exercise uncover significant findings about zakat, and demonstrate its substantial economic and social impact in Pakistan.
Before moving on, it is important to clarify some aspects about the survey itself. While no estimate can be perfect, our figures currently represent the most accurate assessment of zakat payments in Pakistan, given the absence of comparable studies. We have implemented two specific methodological improvements to enhance accuracy.
First, we acknowledge that data on religious and charitable giving may be influenced by social desirability bias. Respondents might claim to pay zakat even when they don’t, potentially fearing judgement from interviewers. To address this, we incorporated a list experiment in our survey design.
This methodological approach allowed us to quantify the extent of misreporting. According to direct responses, 52pc of men and 45pc of women reported paying zakat. However, after applying corrections based on the list experiment results, our final calculations assume actual payment rates of 43pc for men and 39pc for women.
The profile most likely to receive zakat according to the conjoint experiment embedded in the survey was widowed women.
These adjustments produce more conservative and realistic estimates than would be obtained through conventional survey methods alone, increasing the reliability of our findings despite the inherent challenges in measuring religious giving practices.
According to the data we collected, Pakistanis contribute more than Rs619 billion in zakat each year. In 2024, the average contributor gave approximately Rs15,000, with over 50 million Pakistanis participating.
This annual zakat distribution exceeds the budget of the Benazir Income Support Programme, Pakistan’s largest state-led cash transfer initiative, which was allocated Rs598.71bn for 2024-2025. The zakat total also surpasses revenue from federal excise duty (Rs576bn in 2023-2024) and the amount Pakistan received in official development aid in 2022, despite being among South Asia’s major aid recipients. It is important to note that the estimates likely understate the actual amount suggesting that the true figure may be higher.
We were also able to document how the actual practice of zakat in the country varies significantly from the state’s policymaking and administration around the issue. Since the 1980s, Pakistan has maintained a system for compulsory zakat collection through a state-administered fund with councils at the federal, provincial and district levels. However, the survey reveals that most Pakistanis prefer to bypass this system, with less than 2pc of contributors utilising the state fund.
This avoidance reflects a broader pattern of low trust in government institutions. The national state fund collects merely one-fiftieth of the estimated annual zakat contributions, as respondents overwhelmingly indicated a preference for managing their own giving.
The majority of zakat is thus distributed directly to individuals. Some contributors opt for intermediaries while still avoiding the state, choosing to give through mosques, schools, and to a lesser extent, non-governmental organisations.
Another main finding from our work is that gender significantly influences zakat distribution patterns. Through analysis of reported giving behaviours and a conjoint survey experiment, we consistently find that people prefer giving zakat to women, regardless of the contributor’s gender. This gender preference is not prescribed in religious texts. While the Quran identifies eligible categories for zakat — including the poor, the needy, administrators of zakat, recent converts, those in bondage or debt, those serving God’s cause, and travellers in need — it does not specify gender preferences for recipients.
Nevertheless, our survey finds that more than half of respondents who gave zakat to individuals reported giving zakat exclusively to female recipients. This pattern suggests that zakat contributors recognise the economic challenges and barriers to state social protection that women in Pakistan face. In fact, the profile most likely to receive zakat according to the conjoint experiment embedded in the survey was widowed women, indicating that contributors consider both gender and economic vulnerability when determining recipients.
These findings highlight the importance of studying non-state social protection and redistribution mechanisms in Muslim countries, particularly given the scale of zakat compared to other social protection channels.
The next steps in our study of zakat will focus on a series of additional questions, especially those related to individual giving and its distributional impact: What factors determine who gives zakat? Why do people avoid the state fund? Are there biases in giving patterns based on proximity, language, or ethnic background? Do zakat practices vary by region, religiosity, or jurisprudential approach? How does widespread zakat payment affect attitudes toward state-led redistribution efforts like wealth taxes?
The answers to these questions will provide further insight into the complex relationship between religious giving, social welfare, and governance in Pakistan and potentially other Muslim-majority countries.
Max Gallien and Vanessa van den Boogard are researchers at the International Centre for Tax and Development. Umair Javed teaches at Lums.
Published in Dawn, April 28th, 2025
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