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Muhammad Amir Rana //DAWN: April 20, 2025
IT is often argued that Pakistan lacks a clear and independent Afghan policy. What the establishment has historically pursued on the Afghan front has largely been an extension of its India-centric approach. Once a pro-India regime was dislodged in Kabul, Islamabad appeared uncertain about navigating the new reality. Much of the establishment and its aligned intelligentsia held utopian expectations of forging transnational mega projects and cultivating a friendly regime in the neighbourhood.
Those belonging to the millennial and Gen X cohorts may recall the slogans and chants from political rallies of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad, a political alliance engineered by Gen Hamid Gul to counter Benazir Bhutto’s PPP and to preserve the so-called gains the establishment had made through its involvement in the Afghan jihad. One slogan stood out in particular: “Tum nay Dhaka diya, hum nay Kabul liya” (‘You lost Dhaka, and we gained Kabul’). This was a jibe at the PPP, which the establishment blamed for the loss of East Pakistan.
While the PML, led primarily by Nawaz Sharif, was the establishment’s favoured political force, the Jamaat-i-Islami dominated the ideological narrative within the alliance. The JI was one of the key allies of the establishment in waging jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It also has a controversial history of violently opposing Bengali demands for political rights, including through the formation of militias to suppress the pro-independence movement in East Pakistan. As an ideological partner of the establishment, the JI played a significant role in sowing the seeds of extremism and violence within Pakistani society.
Despite enjoying institutional backing, the JI has consistently failed to win popular support or achieve meaningful electoral victories — outcomes the establishment long hoped for but never realised.
The Taliban are stoking anti-Pakistan sentiment within Afghanistan.
In essence, the JI played a pivotal role in helping the establishment craft its Afghan policy, aligning it with Pakistan’s broader strategic approach towards India. Since Pakistan’s inception, Afghanistan has only reluctantly accepted its sovereignty, frequently supporting ethnic and separatist movements in KP and Balochistan and maintaining close ties with India. However, while Afghanistan has remained a constant source of tension, it has never posed a direct military threat to Pakistan, even during the wars of 1965 and 1971.
Pakistan and Afghanistan have always had the possibility of developing cordial relations despite aligning with opposing blocs during the Cold War era. However, the ego-driven power elites on both sides rarely missed an opportunity to provoke or antagonise one another.
Pakistan’s support for the Afghan Taliban was based on the assumption that it would secure a friendly regime on its western border. Critics, however, question the establishment’s definition of a ‘friendly nation’, arguing that it often implies a desire to dominate or make others subservient. But it’s quite straightforward: a country’s national character or ‘DNA’ does not change with a change in regime. Even when new governments are grateful to their external backers, realpolitik and national interests eventually shape relationships.
The TTP has become one of the most serious irritants in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, exposing the deep fault lines between the two nations. When faced with a choice, the Afghan Taliban regime appeared to favour the TTP over maintaining smooth relations with Pakistan. In doing so, it followed the familiar pattern of previous Afghan governments approaching their ties with Islamabad.
Pakistan’s long-held dream of securing strategic depth through a Taliban-controlled Kabul has now largely unravelled. While it may not have entirely abandoned hope, Pakistan is struggling to come to terms with its miscalculations, particularly the assumption that a Taliban regime would serve its strategic interests unconditionally. There remains anxiety in Islamabad over Afghanistan’s potential for developing closer ties with India, which Pakistan sees as a threat to its western flank.
The friction in bilateral ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan reflects a deep-seated mistrust that continues to grow despite ongoing diplomatic efforts to maintain a basic level of cooperation on trade and border security. Afghan refugees in Pakistan have become collateral damage in this strained relationship. For the Taliban, the issue of the TTP has become a matter of honour, and protecting it as an asset. In defending the group, they have jeopardised their relationship with Pakistan and shown limited concern for the welfare of Afghan nationals residing in Pakistan.
Meanwhile, the Taliban are stoking anti-Pakistan sentiment within Afghanistan. Their media outlets are actively highlighting the hardships faced by returning Afghan refugees and the alleged humiliation they suffer in Pakistan. This narrative appears to have gained traction even among Afghans who were previously critical of the Taliban regime. Afghan poets and cultural figures are now romanticising the Taliban’s rule, vilifying Pakistan, and urging refugees to return home after decades of displacement.
The current situation offers an opportunity for soul-searching, particularly for the establishment and its allied religious parties that once championed ‘jihad’ in Afghanistan. However, Pakistan appears to be in a reactionary mode, and its policy of expelling Afghan refugees may be driven more by political motives than by strategic planning.
This punitive approach reflects not only frustration but also a quiet acknowledgment of the failure of Pakistan’s Afghan policy, a policy that spanned five decades and yielded little more than terrorism, extremism, economic fragility, and weakened governance. These consequences continue to cast a long shadow over Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan.
Reopening old wounds will not lead to healing. What’s needed is a fresh start — a new approach to engagement with Afghanistan. That new beginning could start with revisiting Pakistan’s refugee policy and developing a comprehensive, dignified plan for the safe and voluntary return of Afghan refugees.
Such a plan should go beyond humanitarian concerns and aim to foster bilateral and transnational economic cooperation. Most importantly, it must include a firm commitment to non-interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, regardless of the agendas of global or regional powers. Any new adventure in Afghan territory would not only deepen instability there but also further inflame unrest in Pakistan’s own vulnerable regions, Balochistan and KP, which are already bearing the brunt of flawed past policies.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, April 20th, 2025
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Abbas Nasir //DAWN: April 20, 2025
IRAN’S Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff met at the negotiating table in Rome yesterday to take forward ‘positive’ talks on Tehran’s nuclear programme initiated last week in, and mediated by, Oman. However, there is little clarity on what the process will deliver, although the two sides have reportedly agreed to task experts to discuss a framework for a potential deal in Oman next week.
With Donald Trump at the helm in the US, policies, particularly foreign policy, may appear chaotic but are generally formulated to uphold the interests of the apartheid state of Israel, as big donors to American politicians’ election campaigns — presidential candidates or Congressional — demand and get their pound of flesh.
This was evident in the fate of the Gaza ceasefire, which went into effect to coincide with Trump’s inauguration at his insistence, because he was keen to be seen as a peacemaker-president, despite Israeli reticence. The US envoy’s arm-twisting worked. But only for a while.
A lot of lobbying takes place behind closed doors — away from the public eye — as must have happened in this case too. The result: Israel unilaterally violated the terms of the ceasefire agreement and changed goalposts, before resuming its genocidal military campaign in Gaza.
A media leak said Trump vetoed an Israeli plan for a joint attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Credible third-party statistics say most Israeli air strikes post-ceasefire have targeted women and children. Rescue workers have also been attacked; in one incident alone 15 of them were ambushed and killed by the occupation forces.
A cover-up attempt failed because one of the murdered ambulance workers’ mobile phone recorded the whole incident. It exposed Israel’s lie that the ambulances were moving suspiciously, without lights or beacons. The video was found in the phone buried in a shallow grave with the paramedic.
Of course, no outrage was expressed by any democratic Western government. Such is Israel and its backers’ influence that from the US to the UK to Germany in the EU, the right to protest — one of the most fundamental human rights — is being trampled upon in the name of ‘antisemitism’.
The tragedy of the Holocaust is too recent a crime against humanity to be forgotten, and nobody can support bias of any kind; but it is far too convenient, and wrong to label any criticism of the occupation and the denial of Palestinians’ rights and their mass murder by Israel as ‘antisemitic.’ It is not.
Against this backdrop, why is America negotiating with Iran to get it to move away from enriching uranium to 90pc or more (weapons-grade) from the current 60pc and not going for the military option? From the US perspective, many of Iran’s oil-rich Gulf neighbours are very nervous about the outbreak of any hostilities spilling over onto their soil. So while Israel has publicly advocated for a ‘Libya-like’ dismantling of Iran’s nuclear capability, the US position isn’t that unambiguously maximalist.
Witkoff has gone on record to say that a reduction in enrichment to a level that is for civilian use only will be acceptable. Obviously, under pressure from Israel, officials in Washington started backtracking on his statement, without really spelling out exactly what is acceptable.
Although officially it wasn’t said to be linked to the Iran-US talks, the timing of the visit this week to Tehran by Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, a former fighter pilot, and his chief of general staff could not have been coincidental. Considerable bonhomie was on display and significantly the visitor was granted an audience by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
The visit seemed aimed at underlining the Saudi position to Tehran that Riyadh disapproves of any US-Israeli military action against Iran, since Iran and Saudi Arabia’s relations are now back on track after a China-mediated normalisation process.
It was clear from a media leak originating in Israel that the apartheid state wishes to attack and degrade Iran’s military capability. The leak said Trump vetoed an Israeli plan for a joint attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
The plan proposed American air cover as Israeli ‘commandos’ landed on the ground, penetrated fortified facilities deep underground and destroyed them. Even a US president totally beholden to the apartheid state saw the dangers of such an escalation and preferred talks.
While he owes much to Israel, as is clear from huge arms shipments to it and the expulsion of even permanent American residents for merely protesting against the Gaza genocide, he also has commercial ties with the Saudis and wants to keep them and other Gulf states onside. Moreover, Trump sees himself as bathed in glory as a peacemaker by expanding the Abraham Accords to Saudi Arabia.
Iran has made clear that it is willing to agree to any ‘reasonable’ demands, ie, it may be amenable to reducing its enrichment to verifiable civilian use thresholds but would not be prepared to ‘dismantle’ its programme. Crippling sanctions may have brought Iran to the negotiating table but its red lines remain.
Many analysts say Iran is prepared to accept what was agreed to in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement during the Obama administration — a deal which Trump annulled in 2018, despite IAEA certification that Iran was adhering to its commitments. This was done under Israeli pressure.
A lot has changed since in the region, especially with the consolidation of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s role. The de facto Saudi leader may not have been assertive then as he needed American support to cement himself at the helm. But, observers say, he seems to have come of age now.
The Gulf leaders’ disdain for what they see as religiously inspired militancy in the Muslim world, particularly in Gaza, may keep them from doing anything concrete to stop the genocide but even they would see the perils of endorsing an attack on Iran as they may themselves get sucked into the conflict.
Let’s see if the talks break down and things move towards Israel’s position or sanity prevails and a peaceful path is negotiated out of what could be a bloody scenario and regional conflagration.
The writer is a former editor of Dawn.
abbas.nasir@hotmail.com
Published in Dawn, April 20th, 2025
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