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Rafiullah Kakar //DAWN: April 18, 2025
THE recently concluded Mineral Summit was proclaimed a success by federal officials. Yet beneath the celebratory tone lies a contentious debate — particularly in KP and Balochistan — over a draft mining legislation reportedly prepared under the supervision of the SIFC. The Balochistan government has already enacted a version of this bill, while KP continues to deliberate.
The timing of this legislation, and the opaque process that birthed it, have raised legitimate concerns about its constitutional validity, centralising tendencies, and potential sociopolitical fallout. Constitutionally, provinces in Pakistan have long held exclusive jurisdiction over minerals — excluding nuclear-related resources — even prior to the 18th Amendment. In this context, fears of federal encroachment are not without basis.
The KP bill, while imperfect, retains essential elements of provincial control. Its references to the federal mineral wing are advisory and non-binding. Still, their very inclusion invites future overreach. In contrast, the Balochistan Act goes a step further. It not only permits the federal mineral wing to make recommendations on mineral development, licensing, leasing, and financial aspects including royalties, but appears to surrender the province’s right to initiate proposals on these matters, reducing its role to one of passive review. Though technically non-binding, the legal role of the federal government can potentially lead to serious encroachment.
Legally binding frameworks are needed for benefit-sharing and local ownership.
Both the KP and Balochistan frameworks allow temporary permits to be granted for projects deemed of “national interest” — a vague designation that includes licences to federally owned public enterprises. Such provisions undermine provincial autonomy.
To their credit, the laws decentralise some authority to newly established provincial mineral authorities and district committees, replacing the erstwhile discretion of secretaries, directors general, and deputy commissioners. However, the inclusion of two federal representatives with voting rights in provincial authority might be problematic. These members should serve as observers, not decision-making members.
One of the most glaring omissions in both laws is the absence of meaningful representation for local communities, mining associations, and independent experts in the governance structures. In a sector as complex and high-stakes as mining, leaving governance solely to bureaucrats and politicians is a recipe for failure. Equally problematic are vague, largely non-enforceable clauses on community benefits and employment preferences. What is needed are legally binding frameworks for community participation, benefit-sharing, and local ownership. In short, while the KP bill requires minor amendments, the Balochistan Act needs to be repealed, as it contains clauses that effectively hand over certain powers to federal authorities.
Just as troubling is the process through which the legislation has been drafted and enacted. The SIFC — an extra-constitutional body — has driven the process with apparently little transparency. In a context where political legitimacy of both federal and provincial governments remains contested, this top-down approach is counterproductive. It risks deepening community mistrust and fuelling provincial grievances, even if the resulting agreements are legally sound.
Mining is a long-horizon sector. It demands political stability, policy continuity, and social licence to operate. But Pakistan’s political elite functions on extremely short time horizons, motivated more by immediate gains and rent-seeking than long-term planning. Past episodes — Reko Diq, IPPs — are cautionary tales of rushed, opaque deals that ended in litigation or disrepute. On a technical level, the country lacks the institutional depth and financial capacity to negotiate mining contracts that balance investor interest with public good. In the current climate, any foreign-backed agreements are more likely to serve short-term gains than long-term development.
Similarly, our history of community benefit-sharing in mining is dismal. Corporate social responsibility remains tokenistic at best, with few tangible gains for affected populations. The new legislations do little to reverse this trend. What is needed is a complete rethink of the model — one that places local communities at the heart of decision-making and revenue-sharing. To ensure community ownership and provincial autonomy, the following steps are essential:
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Peace and consensus first: No foreign investor can operate sustainably without peace, political stability and provincial buy-in. The experience of CPEC in Balochistan offers a stark warning.
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Eliminate federal overreach: All references to the federal mineral wing should be removed. An ‘Inter-Provincial Mineral Coordination Council’ may be established, instead, to harmonise policy among provinces while respecting their autonomy.
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Mandatory community consent: The free, prior and informed consent of local communities must be a legal prerequisite for all large-scale mining projects.
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Revenue sharing with community: At least five per cent of royaltiesmust go directly to resource-producing districts, over and above provincial royalty.
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Employment guarantees: Mining legislation should mandate 100pc local employment in unskilled jobs and a minimum of 50pc in skilled roles, with a plan to raise the latter to 90pc over 10 years.
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Establish a provincial mineral wealth and development fund: This should include: a provincial wealth fund, where 25-40pc of royalties are saved for future generations under strict fiduciary rules and independent oversight; a community development fund to pool 5pc district royalties, 3-5pc company profits and other funds for investment in infrastructure and services of local community.
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Transparency as policy: All mining licences and contracts, including those for Reko Diq and Saindak, must be fully disclosed; companies linked to politically exposed persons should be flagged; and detailed, disaggregated data on royalties, production, taxes, and social expenditures must be published regularly.
Pakistan stands at a crossroads. It can either repeat the mistakes of opaque, centralised, and authoritarian resource governance—or it can reimagine mining as a platform for inclusive, democratic, and community-led development. If reforms are not grounded in transparency, accountability, and respect for provincial and community rights, then no summit, however well-marketed, will bring lasting prosperity.
The writer is a public policy and development specialist from Balochistan.
X: @rafiullahkakar
Published in Dawn, April 18th, 2025
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Rida Tahir //DAWN: April 18, 2025
WOMEN make up only two per cent of the police force across Pakistan. Considering they constitute around half of the total population, this stark underrepresentation highlights a significant gender disparity in the country’s law enforcement.
A 2024 report by the Social Development Organisation states that while globally 20pc of women face abuse, a shocking 90pc of Pakistan’s females endure violence. Therefore, it is crucial to adopt survivor-centric models of reporting and access to justice. Meanwhile, most cases of violence against women and their children (VAWC) go unreported. To increase reporting, a safe and supportive environment for individuals must be promoted. An increase in reported cases should not be seen solely as a rise in crime, but also as a sign that more people may be placing their trust in the criminal justice system (CJS).
As reporting to the police increases, it may indicate a stronger belief in the system and the pursuit of justice. Holding perpetrators accountable helps reduce repeat offences over time, which leads to gradual reform in society.
Women, children and trans persons feel more comfortable reporting their grievances, particularly sensitive cases of VAWC, to female police officers. Possessing the same professional skills as their male counterparts, women police officers also demonstrate a heightened sensitivity to gender-related issues. This is why women’s police stations were the initiative of Pakistan’s only female prime minister Benazir Bhutto, who understood the obstacles to reporting gender-based cases to male officers.
Justice Ayesha Malik’s landmark judgements also show how women better understand the experiences of other women; she was the one who declared the two-finger test in rape cases illegal and recognised gender discrimination as workplace harassment.
Sindh has shown resourcefulness in provincial policing by starting women-led initiatives. One of them is the women and children protection centres (WCPC) that have been set up in all districts of the province. These are not police stations but facilitation centres.
At these centres, uniformed women police officers facilitate the complainant in terms of how they can move forward in cases of family disputes, including those pertaining to maintenance and custody, in which the affected parties do not want to involve the courts. The WCPC can be seen as an informal alternative dispute resolution mechanism. Mediation between families often results in a written and signed ‘compromise’ or ‘mafinama’. Other times, a ‘warning’ or ‘caution’ may be given to a perpetrator before the formal CJS process starts with the registration of the FIR.
In domestic disputes, it is crucial that victims/ survivors are empowered to make their own decisions according to the circumstances of their case. These are different from other aggravated gender-based violence (GBV) offences, such as ‘honour’ killings and sexual violence where the state can register an FIR on its own initiative and where there is no room for a ‘compromise’. In such cases, facilitation of the relevant police station for registration of the FIR must be provided.
Different models of access to justice work for different cases of GBV, and should be designed to empower the victim. One model is the one-stop protection centre, which has been set up in Hyderabad. Women and girls in South Asia face mobility challenges. OSPCs eliminate the need for victims/ survivors to travel to multiple locations in a state of vulnerability to access support services. The OSPC operates as a one-location centre, providing immediate support and assistance to victims/ survivors of GBV by placing all sectoral responses (health, psychosocial, counselling, legal services and police) under one roof.
In Pakistan, the CJS is hindered by a serious lack of female representation. Women account for less than 2pc of the superior judiciary and under 15pc of the subordinate judiciary. Likewise, their presence in prosecution services and medico-legal fields is limited. Greater female participation in the CJS must be encouraged through providing equal wages, maternity benefits, and essential facilities such as women’s restrooms and dedicated spaces that prioritise the well-being of female professionals.
Increasing women’s representation in the police force and expanding women-led initiatives like WCPCs and OSPCs is crucial, as police are the first point of contact for victims. However, it’s equally important to ensure women’s presence across the entire CJS including as medico-legal officers, lawyers, prosecutors, and judges to ensure survivor-centric, empathetic and effective justice at every stage.
The writer is a barrister of Lincoln’s Inn and an advocate of the high courts of Pakistan.
Published in Dawn, April 18th, 2025
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Sara Malkani Published April 18, 2025
[Especially good for the students of Gender Studies and a must read for the students of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence]
LAST year, the Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed that a woman is entitled to dissolve her marriage on the grounds that her husband, without her permission, married another woman. Recently, the Council of Islamic Ideology released a statement rejecting this decision, asserting that it is against Islamic law to permit a woman to dissolve her marriage because she did not consent to her husband’s marriage to another woman. The CII is an advisory body and cannot overrule the Supreme Court, but is deemed to be an authority on the requirements of Islamic law.
The fact that in 2024, the Supreme Court had to author a detailed judgement to clarify very straightforward statutory provisions in the Muslim Family Law Ordinance (MFLO), 1961, and the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 — which was then repudiated by the CII — is an indication of the manufactured confusion around family laws in Pakistan.
Why does this confusion persist? Muslim personal law covers matters related to marriage, divorce and inheritance for the majority of Pakistan’s population. Personal law is partially codified in the form of statutes derived from religious jurisprudence. Courts and religious bodies often misinterpret the plain meaning of statutes to conform to their own views of Islamic jurisprudence. For example, courts have repeatedly misread the 1961 ordinance’s provisions on talaq, often refusing to enforce the notice and registration requirements in the law. They also tend to fill in the gaps in codified laws with conservative interpretations of Islamic law.
The origins of Muslim personal law lie in the British colonial era. As the colonial government began to introduce legislation regulating political and economic spheres, it carved out exceptions for matters related to marriage, divorce and inheritance, declaring that these would be dealt with in accordance with the custom and religious laws of each community.
Muslim political groups were keen to secure the primacy of the Sharia over custom in matters of family law and inheritance. In 1937, Muslims secured legislation that declared that personal law derived from the Sharia alone rather than custom would govern family matters and inheritance for Muslims.
Prior to independence, Muslims secured another codified law — the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act passed in 1939. While this law established the right of Muslim women to dissolve their marriage in certain circumstances, the motivation behind the law was not the promotion of women’s rights. In fact, it was passed to prevent Muslim women from renouncing their faith and marrying non-Muslims. Prior to this law, Muslim women seeking to end a marriage could only do so after they converted to another religion, which would lead to the automatic termination of their marriage to a Muslim man. This would also enable Muslim women to marry outside their faith after their marriage to the Muslim man stood terminated.
Muslims in the subcontinent, like other religious communities, were extremely concerned about losing their members, especially women, to marriage outside their communities. The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, specifically stated that renunciation of their faith by a married Muslim or her conversion to another faith shall not by itself dissolve her marriage.
After independence, Muslim personal law continued to govern family matters for Muslims in Pakistan. When, in 1955, Prime Minister Bogra entered into a second marriage, protests by prominent women led to the formation of the Rashid Commission, whose objective was to recommend reforms to Muslim personal law and “give women their proper place in society according to fundamentals of Islam”. The commission’s recommendations included limitations on polygamy and compulsory registration of the nikahnama. Its cautious recommendations were opposed by conservative forces and it was not until 1961 that Field Marshal Ayub Khan promulgated the MFLO, which incorporated some of the commission’s recommendations.
The MFLO fell short of demands of women’s rights activists as it permitted polygamy as well as unilateral divorce, while introducing some safeguards for women. Even these limited protections were subsequently watered down through judicial interpretations. The Zina Ordinance, imposed by Gen Ziaul Haq, introduced strict penalties of adultery and fornication, making enforcement of MFLO even more complicated. Divorce or talaq that did not meet the MFLO’s requirements was validated by the courts to protect women who remarried after they thought they had been divorced by their husbands.
The gap between codified law and court interpretations, contradictory decisions by courts, and pronouncements by religious authorities continue to create uncertainty around family laws. Women and children suffer the most due to this confusion.
How do we move beyond this confusion? In place of fragmented and incoherent family laws, we should adopt codified laws related to marriage, divorce and inheritance that take precedence over non-codified interpretations of religious jurisprudence. A central objective behind framing these civil laws should be consistency with fundamental rights in the Constitution, including the right to equal protection under the law and prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex.
The Supreme Court should provide clear directions to the judiciary on application of family laws and specify that courts are bound to enforce statutes, judicial precedent and the Constitution. Courts cannot selectively impose their interpretations of religious jurisprudence.
Efforts to improve family laws so far prove that reforms relying on progressive interpretations of Islamic law tend to fall short. They are further weakened by conservative enforcement. Recognising this hurdle, women’s rights activists, in particular the Women’s Action Forum, have recommended a more enlightened approach towards all matters related to marriage and inheritance. It is high time our lawmakers accepted their recommendations.
The writer is a lawyer.
malkani.sara@gmail.com
Published in Dawn, April 18th, 2025
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DAWN EDITORIAL: 18 April 2025
THE desecration of 85 Muslim graves at a cemetery in Hertfordshire in the UK is a distressing act that deserves the strongest condemnation. The fact that many of the damaged graves belong to babies and young children only underscores the cruelty of this hate crime, which has left grieving families and the wider Muslim community in shock. While Hertfordshire Police have now confirmed that the incident is being treated as a religiously motivated hate crime, the delay in officially recognising it as such understandably frustrated affected families and Muslim community leaders. As Sergeant Irfan Ishaq of the Hertfordshire Association of Muslim Police rightly acknowledged, the pain of this crime has resonated beyond those immediately impacted, touching Muslims across the UK and beyond.
The British authorities must take swift and decisive action. Acts of hate, particularly those that target a community’s most sacred spaces, are not only personal violations but also attacks on the fabric of a diverse and democratic society. Allowing such crimes to go unpunished will only embolden those who seek to sow fear and division. The UK government, alongside local authorities, must ensure that investigations into this act are pursued with urgency and transparency. Every possible lead should be followed, and the perpetrators brought to justice. Moreover, the government must prioritise meaningful engagement with Muslim communities, ensuring their safety and restoring their trust in the system. However, incidents like this do not occur in a vacuum. Rising Islamophobia, stoked by toxic rhetoric in politics and media, is creating an environment in which hate crimes have become alarmingly common in Western societies. Without robust action, such attacks risk becoming normalised. Graves are places of peace and memory. Desecrating them is a profound moral violation and points to the most sinister of intentions. Authorities must find and punish those responsible and also reassure the nation’s Muslim communities that they have a secure and respected place in British society.
Published in Dawn, April 18th, 2025
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DAWN EDITORIAL: 18 April 2025
THOUGH the BNP-M may have ended its 20-day protest sit-in outside Quetta on Wednesday, the core issues affecting Balochistan — terrorism and the alienation of large sections of the province’s population from the centre — remain unresolved. Former chief minister and BNP-M head Akhtar Mengal decided to wrap things up after the state did not allow him or his supporters to march to Quetta. The veteran politician had initiated a protest campaign after the authorities detained BYC’s Mahrang Baloch and other activists. Mr Mengal blamed the state for “obstructing” his march, and said that while the sit-in had ended, protests would be held across different cities and towns in Balochistan to continue to press for their demands. Several opposition parties and activists expressed solidarity with the BNP protest, though the government did not yield. In fact, Balochistan CM Sarfraz Bugti continued to use strong language against the BYC, while commenting on the BNP’s decision to call off the sit-in.
While proponents of the ‘hard state’ may argue that Baloch political activity must be crushed along with separatist terrorism, this approach is counterproductive. Violence will continue to haunt Balochistan as the separatists use terrorism to forward their aims, and the state strikes back with full force. An alternative path — dialogue, reconciliation and inclusive development — can be tried, if the state wishes to give it a shot. After all, decades of a militarised approach to solving Balochistan’s problems failed to achieve any meaningful objective. First, the government needs to differentiate between those who take up arms against the state, and those who use peaceful constitutional means to demand their rights. The former must be neutralised, while the latter should be engaged. At the other end, some activists resort to harsh anti-government rhetoric; this will hardly help the Baloch cause. Secondly, the state needs to acknowledge that mistakes have been made. This would not be a sign of weakness, but one of wisdom. For example, the problem of enforced disappearances and other violations of fundamental rights in Balochistan is not a new one. Today, it is the BYC that is raising these issues; earlier it was Mama Qadeer and others. If the state uses unconstitutional means in the province, there will be blowback from those affected. Therefore, a more compassionate and inclusive approach is needed in Balochistan.
Published in Dawn, April 18th, 2025
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