THE recent announcement regarding the renewal of ceasefire along the LoC has evoked both cautious welcome and considerable scepticism[شک وشبہہ]. Even as a tactical move, it has the potential to lead to something more substantive given the required political will on both sides. Although it is too early to talk of a peace process, yet, since the announcement of the ceasefire, many references have been made in the media to the so-called four-point formula referring to an earlier period (2003-2007) when the situation between the two countries had improved so dramatically that they had succeeded in even drawing up a framework of a possible agreement on Kashmir. I have been asked by many to throw some more light on that framework since I was foreign minister at that momentous time.
The formula had 11 or 12 important ingredients: (i) Substantial demilitarisation beginning with major urban centres with an agreement to keep troops to a minimum along the LoC; this was done, inter alia, also to protect Kashmiris’ human rights.
(ii) Defining units of Kashmir: There would be two units for the purposes of the agreement regarding the disputed State of Jammu & Kashmir under the control of Pakistan and India. They would comprise the areas respectively controlled by the two countries whose governments would be free to have more than one administrative region in the units under their control.
(iii) Maximum self-governance would be granted in legislative, executive, and judicial areas to each unit. It was also agreed that a mechanism would be evolved to achieve this objective
The four-point framework agreement on Kashmir contained some bold proposals.
(iv) A joint mechanism would consist of a specified number of elected members from each of the two units (representatives of Pakistan and India would be present at the meetings). The elected members were to be nominated by the governments of both units. It was also agreed that a decision of the joint mechanism would require more than a bare majority of members of each side and that this mechanism would meet at least twice or thrice a year. It would be entrusted with the responsibility of increasing the number of crossing points, and encourage travel, trade and tourism. It was decided to further streamline transport services and encourage interaction between the peoples as well as exchange of commodities.
(v) One of the most important responsibilities envisaged by this mechanism was to encourage the promotion of common policies towards the development of infrastructure, hydroelectricity, and exploitation of water resources. This would be crucial to maintaining future peace between Pakistan and India.
(vi) Centres to wean militants away through DDR (deradicalisation, disengagement, and rehabilitation).
(vii) Elections: Free and fair elections in the respective units would be held regularly. They would be made open to international observers and the media.
(viii) Monitoring and review process: Any solution that was presented could experience unanticipated difficulties. It was, therefore, appropriate that the agreement be of an interim nature. The envisaged agreement, consequently, provided for a monitoring and review mechanism. The foreign ministers of Pakistan and India would meet at least once a year to monitor the progress of the agreement and it would be subject to a review at the expiration of 15 years.
(ix) LoC — ‘A line on the map’: Pakistani response to India’s position, that the border cannot be changed, was that in that case the border would cease to exist between the Kashmiris, and they would require no visas or passports to travel across the LoC. Effectively, the LoC would be reduced to just a line on the map.
(x) The signing of a treaty of peace, security and friendship like the Élysée Treaty between Germany and France.
xi) Most importantly, there was an unwritten understanding/agreement that neither side would proclaim victory, once the details of the framework had been announced since it was realised that hardline elements on both sides would find something to disagree with in this framework.
(xii) There would be equal self-governance in both units.
During my meetings with leaders of occupied Kashmir in Delhi, Islamabad and secretly in other parts of the world, I had sounded out the Kashmiri leadership. It would be fair to say that except for Syed Ali Shah Gilani, most others supported it. He had, however, supported the Islamabad Joint Statement (2004) which had effectively started the peace process.
It may be too early to talk of a peace-process that requires an enabling environment. Unfortunately in India, there has been much Pakistan-bashing motivated by partisan political considerations. This was bound to have a negative reaction in Pakistan as the recent flip-flop on trade indicates. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s position in India is so unchallenged today that were he convinced that India’s own interests are best served by peace in South Asia, he would be in a position to move the people in that direction. Significantly, unlike in the past, there has been no Pakistan-bashing in the state elections underway in India.
On this side, Prime Minister Imran Khan as a former cricket star has many friends in India. He was interested in ushering in an era of peace between the two countries and is on record as having supported the ‘four-point formula’ before assuming the office of prime minister. During a visit to Delhi, “he told the Indian premier that at one point Pakistan and India had reached very close to resolving the Kashmir issue” and said the Kashmir issue can be resolved on the framework in Kasuri’s book (Neither a Hawk nor a Dove) reported in many newspapers (including Dawn) in Pakistan and India at that time. Similarly, Gen Bajwa’s recent statement stressing that it was time for India and Pakistan to “bury the past and move forward” is very significant.
In view of the sensitivity of Pak-India relations and Kashmir dispute, I strongly suggest that there needs to be a ‘backchannel’ during our time. Backchannel avoids extensive media coverage and intense speculation that enables opponents of the peace process to put a negative spin. Further, ‘backchannel’ in the absence of media glare makes it easier for the parties to revisit their positions in the light of proposals coming from the other side.
The writer was foreign minister of Pakistan during the period 2002-2007.
Published in Dawn, April 3rd, 2021
The writer is author of Pakistan: In Between Extremism and Peace.
CEDAW’S ratification led to initiatives such as women police stations and women protection laws. But crimes against women did not stop, exposing the failure of society and the criminal justice system (CJS). Despite defined responsibilities, why did individuals, families, society and media fail to prevent CAW? Despite the state’s legal jurisdiction why is violence against women perceived as a family affair here? Prompt response to and reporting of CAW can move CJS wheels but because CAW is seen as a family affair, countless incidents go unreported.
Owing to a discrepancy in statistics, it’s hard to quantify CAW. For suicide, rape, murder and injury, medico-legal opinion has decisive weight but resource constraints, operational problems, social taboos and poor coordination hamper justice. MLOs delay reports and write them in isolation. Better coordination between investigators and MLOs will improve report quality. Completing medico-legal reports within a specific period reduces chances of manipulation; to improve coordination every district should have software accessible to authorised judges, prosecutors, doctors and SP investigation. Medical evidence is irrefutable. Timely medical examination helps justice. Availability of medical reports ensures that during investigation an FIR is not cancelled nor a compromise effected.
Honour killing is seen as an intra-family cultural practice; registered cases don’t depict real numbers. In rural areas cultural norms hinder FIR registration. Even if cases are registered, these are weak as circumstantial evidence is tampered with by families, while witnesses do not record their statements. Non-observance of medico-legal formalities and biased attitudes aids the accused. Often families portray honour killings as suicide or accidents.
Autopsy refusal creates complications. Delayed receipt of reports results in forwarding the case progress to courts without medico-legal opinion. Determining the age of the accused and victim, distinguishing between murder, suicide, and honour killing require better coordination between doctors and investigators.
Women pay the price of CJS flaws.
Where the victim’s parents are complainants, they depend on fabricated evidence provided by the husband or in-laws. Upon learning the facts, they may change their statement which is to the accused’s advantage. Cultural biases and CJS loopholes help the accused. Inexperienced investigators handle such cases casually and often actors within the CJS treat the accused with respect. Sensitising the actors is necessary.
Cultural barriers hinder male responders’ and investigators’ access to the crime scene. Witnesses and accused in the family do not cooperate and destroy evidence. Drafting FIRs in a casual language and not applying the law’s correct sections benefit the accused. Where the accused and complainant are from the same family, investigators face difficulties in attaching property under CrPc Section 88. Non-recovery of the weapon of offence and non-preservation of circumstantial evidence mars investigations. Communities must learn CAW is a criminal offence requiring instant reporting. Communication gaps between operations and investigation officers deprive investigators of access to the actual scene of occurrence. Hence, circumstantial evidence is usually tampered with.
A woman victim pays the price of CJS flaws. Out-of-court settlements negatively influence investigations. Since junior police officers are primarily from the rural areas, most have a stereotypical thinking about women. Though harassment has been elaborated on, its essence is yet to trickle down. For such minds, harassment may not be a crime. Understanding women protection laws isn’t possible without incorporating them in the police curriculum. There is a Gender Crimes Cell in the National Police Bureau but its effectiveness warrants a third-party audit. Plugging gaps between cases reported to the police and reported by media and NGOs is not possible without legal backup and institutional collaboration.
To advise the government on gender issues and standardisation, Article 160 of PO 2020 provides for a Police Management Board. But adoption of the Police Act, 1861, in Balochistan, KP Police Act, 2017, and the amended Sindh Police Order, 2019, omit the federal part in the police laws. Hence only Punjab’s police law contains the concept of PMB. Standardisation warrants the adoption of the original PO 2002. Dysfunctional public safety commissions and police complaint authorities compromise women’s interests. To improve prevention and conviction, in district criminal justice committees representatives from the health and social welfare departments must be co-opted. To cater to the needs of women, public safety funds must be used to improve police stations.
Improved prevention, response, simplification of reporting procedures, access to helplines, better linkages between police and shelters, quality of investigation, police training, allocation of resources and community empowerment will reduce CAW.
The writer is author of Pakistan: In Between Extremism and Peace.
Twitter: @alibabakhel
Published in Dawn, April 3rd, 2021
The writer is an author and lawyer based in Mumbai.
THE US struck a poor low in the conduct of diplomatic relations recently. One thought that President Joe Biden would break with his predecessor Donald Trump’s crudeness. Its senior officials met senior officials of China last month on American soil. The talks were supposed to break the ice in their relations. Tradition requires extra civility for such openings. The US delegates began with uncalled for uncivility to China’s top diplomats. The latter gave back as good as they got.
Since George H.W. Bush, America’s presidents have revelled in calling heads of other states names; from Iraq’s Saddam Hussein to the leaders of North Korea, Iran and others. If this exercise was designed to promote America’s interests, the gains were not visible.
Diplomacy is a blend of words and actions. When Anthony Eden, otherwise a highly cultured man, called Egypt’s president Gemal Abdel Nasser names, the astute ones[عقلمند لوگ] predicted he had forsaken diplomacy and was sold on war. But the boorish language of recent American vintage [سال کی نئی شراب یہان مطلب نئی پیداوار یا نیا دور]doesn’t presage [علامات کا اظہار کرنا]war. It is intended to browbeat in the game of negotiation. Sparta’s leaders’ response to the verbosity of a mission from the island of Samoa is a classic of its kind: “We have forgotten the beginning of your harangue[لمبی اور جارحانہ تقریر]; we paid no heed to the middle of it; and nothing has given us pleasure in it except the end.”
Wit is one of the diplomat’s prized possessions.
Romans housed ambassadors in rat-infested buildings. China was barely civil to foreigners. In modern times, Nikita Kruschev flouted all the norms of civility. While on a visit to Beijing in 1959, he shouted at Marshal Chen Yi, “Don’t try and spit at me. There isn’t enough spit in your mouth for that.” As the Sino-Soviet Cold War became fierce, the Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko lamented that even in the worst days of the Cold War, Western spokesmen never used the language that the erstwhile friends (China) did. Gromyko himself could be very rude. He told Pakistan’s diplomats during the crisis in East Pakistan in 1971: “Note I did not use the word ‘please’.”
There was a time when the British set high standards of civility and wit in diplomacy. Prime minister George Canning told the House of Commons on April 30, 1829, “But be the language of good sense or good taste in this House what it may, clear I am that, in diplomatic correspondence, no minister would be justified in risking the friendship of foreign countries, and the peace of his own, by coarse reproach [شکوہ شکایت کرنا یا برا بھلا کہنا] and galling invective[کڑوی کسیلی گالیوں سے بھری زبان] ; and that even while we are pleading for the independence of nations, it is expedient [عملی لحاظ سے بہتر]to respect the independence of those with whom we plead.
“We differ widely from our continental allies on one great principle, it is true: nor do we, nor ought we to disguise that difference; nor to omit any occasion of practically upholding our own opinion. But every consideration, whether of policy or of justice, combines with the recollection of the counsels which we have shared, and of the deeds which we have achieved in concert and companionship, to induce us to argue our differences of opinion, however freely, with temper; and to enforce them, however firmly, without insult.”
British diplomats were noted for understatement. But as Harold Wilson noted in his classic Diplomacy: “In extreme cases, moreover, the habit of diplomatic ambiguity, or of diplomatic understatement, leads to actual misunderstanding. I remember before the war reading a dispatch from some consul general in which he informed the Foreign Office that one of the vice consuls under his charge ‘does not, I much regret to report, take the care of his health which his medical advisers would recommend’. The poor man was, in fact, in the last stages of delirium tremens.”
Dr Paul Schmidt, Hitler’s interpreter, mentions Nevile Henderson’s final interview with Ribbentrop before the war. “I can tell you, Herr Henderson,” Ribbentrop remarked, “That the position is damned serious.” Henderson shouted, “You have just said ‘damned’.”
“Ribbentrop’s breath was taken away. One of the ‘cowardly’ diplomats, an ambassador, and an arrogant Englishman at that, had dared to reprimand him as he as he might a schoolboy. Ribbentrop jumped up from his chair. ‘What did you say?’ he roared. ‘Henderson too had risen to his feet. Both men glared at each other. According to diplomatic convention, I too should have risen; but to be frank I did not quite know how an interpreter should behave when speakers passed from words to deeds — and I really feared they might do so now. I therefore remained quietly seated and pretended to be writing in my notebook.”
Wit is one of the diplomat’s prized possessions. The Spanish ambassador told Britain’s foreign secretary, “Even Spanish liberals in exile support Spain’s case on Gibraltar.” Michael Walker, an Oxford don retorted, “I regret to say that Her Majesty’s Government cannot boast of any British liberals in exile who support its case on Gibraltar.”
The writer is an author and lawyer based in Mumbai.
Published in Dawn, April 3rd, 2021
