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selected News/Columns/Editorials of 06.03.2016
Sun-06Mar-2016
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THE DAWN/06.03.2016
MUNIR AKRAM — The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.
THE dominant sentiment in America today is anger. Popular anger about lower economic expectations; nationalist anger at the loss of global dominance; anger against President Obama for acknowledging the limits of American power; anger against a dysfunctional political system and corrupt and colourless politicians; anger at immigrants for ‘taking’ American jobs; anger against Muslims presumed to be putative terrorists; anger against China for its ‘cheap’ exports that are seen to have killed American manufacturing; anger against Russia’s Putin for defying American power.
Instead of educating the public about the complex causes of America’s challenges, US politicians, especially the Republicans, have sought to cynically exploit this irrational anger to advance their careers and candidacies. The US media has further fuelled this march towards political extremism and irrationality. Outlandish and ignorant ‘bumper sticker’ slogans have become live themes of political debate in the current US presidential race.
Trump’s atrocious insults and threats, in particular, respond to the basest political instincts visible in America. His success in securing such wide support has virtually legitimised the xenophobia, Islamophobia and racism that exists in America but has been denied so far and kept in check by more thinking leaders like President Obama. Unfortunately, the two other leading Republican candidates, Cruz and Rubio, far from refuting Trump’s offensive postures, have sought to embrace some of his message of anger and hate.
It is frightening — for America’s future and global stability — that Trump has emerged as the Republican front runner, despite the opposition of the leaders of the party. Cruz may be as bad in his religious conservatism and Rubio not much better in reflecting realism and rationality. Thus, no matter which of the three leading Republican candidates emerges as the nominee, extremist and aggressive positions will form the bedrock of the Republican political platform.
If either Trump or Cruz is elected much of the right-wing anger may be reflected in US policies.
American anger is, however, not limited to the right wing. On the Democratic ‘left’ too, there is anger at an economic system that is seen to be ‘stacked’ against the poor, and in which inequality is growing (with 1pc of the population owning 50pc of American assets), hollowing out the middle class which been the backbone of American prosperity. There is anger among the young who can no longer expect, like their parents, to participate in the ‘American dream’; anger against politicians in thrall to Wall Street and special interests; anger among African-Americans at the visible evidence of racial discrimination — with 10pc of adult black males in prison and black youth frequently targeted in police violence.
It is thus that perhaps the only genuine ‘socialist’ in the US Senate, the grandfatherly Bernie Sanders, has emerged, after years of political marginalisation, to pose such a surprisingly strong challenge to the ultimate ‘establishment’ candidate, Hillary Clinton. Sanders’ economic analyses and policy positions are mostly sound. The issue is whether, given the structure of power within the US, he would be able to bring about the radical changes required to induct the equity he advocates into a grossly unequal economic and political system. It is this doubt, rather than disagreement with Sanders’ conclusions and prescriptions, that is likely to draw a larger percentage of Democratic voters to Hillary’s side.
The outcome of the 2016 presidential campaign remains uncertain. The odds are that Hillary Clinton will beat out Sanders for the Democratic nomination. The polls show her winning against Trump by the narrowest of margins. Yet, Trump has so far “defied gravity” and could further mobilise American anger to secure the White House. The Republican Party leadership will do its utmost to avoid nominating Trump and promote Rubio. But they will not be able to stand against a popular tide.
If either Trump or Cruz is elected in November, a large part of the American right-wing anger is likely to become reflected in US policies: a virtual if not real wall against immigrants; officially sanctioned discrimination against Muslims; trade tariffs and other barriers against Chinese goods and investment; revived US military interventions in Syria, Iraq, Libya and perhaps Afghanistan; renewed US sanctions against Iran; aggressive military deployments in the Pacific and the East and South China Seas to ‘contain’ a rising China; anti-Chinese alliances around its periphery; as well as significantly expanded military deployments, including missile defences, in Europe to deter a resurgent Russia.
Hillary Clinton’s presidency would probably display, with some differences, a continuity of the Obama administration’s measured approach to most of the complex challenges — internal and external-confronting the US. Domestically, Clinton would embrace the progressive agenda. Externally, she may be less cautious than Obama.
Clinton would need to accommodate some of the Republican policy positions, especially if the US Congress remains under their control. She could not rule a full four years by executive orders as Obama is doing in his final year in office. Her concessions to the other party would most likely be on foreign rather than domestic policy. She may be inclined to: expand US naval deployments and build political alliances against China; attempt to slow its exports to the US; adopt an interventionist role in the Syrian and other Middle East conflicts; and take a more robust stance against Russia in Europe.
What could make the strategic situation volatile is that China is also in the midst of important transitions, as President Xi Jinping consolidates his political authority on the promise of a Chinese ‘dream’ and seeks to transform the Chinese economy, even as it is slowing, from investment- and export-led growth to one fuelled by domestic consumption.
Aggressive American actions are likely to meet strong ‘nationalistic’ responses from Beijing. Asia could become acutely polarised between the US and Chinese ‘camps’. An Asian Cold War could intensify local and regional conflicts. Revived US interventionism in the Muslim world would spread further chaos and strengthen rather than weaken extremism and terrorism. And, Russia remains unbowed and is likely to push back strongly, especially in Europe, at military and political attempts to contain its resurgent presence on the world stage.
The hope is that Winston Churchill was right in his conclusion that: “You can depend on the Americans to do the right thing, after trying everything else.”
The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.
Published in Dawn, March 6th, 2016
THE continued presence of some 1.7 million registered and 1.3m unregistered Afghan refugees in Pakistan highlights the state’s inability to find a long-term solution to the refugee crisis. Recently, the national census was delayed partly because of the provinces’ objections to their presence. There are calls for swift repatriations, perhaps out of fear that the census might reflect or even sanctify demographic changes.
Militancy in the country and the Zarb-i-Azb operation in Fata all seem to have prompted local stakeholders to erroneously link the entire Afghan refugee population with terrorism and civil unrest. Demands for repatriating the refugees have increased in the last two years, with refugees routinely facing hostility, discrimination and police abuse.
While some have argued for outright repatriation, others have taken a more nuanced approach, recognising that second- and third-generation refugees are hardly distinguishable from the local population, live in major urban centres, and contribute to the economy, and that they should be treated differently based on their status and contribution. Refugees historically belonging to the migrant community in Fata with relatives across the border can reside in Fata, but not beyond. Law-abiding businessmen and traders would be eligible for long-term visas, but other refugees would be repatriated.
National politics and ideology have also dictated how refugees are treated or perceived domestically; for example, Kashmiri refugees and their descendants enjoy many of the privileges of citizenship in Pakistan, including the right to vote. This favouritism is at odds with the right to non-discrimination enshrined in Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), under which no distinction is allowed on the basis of national or social origin or the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs.
Pakistan must fulfil its obligations to displaced Afghans.
The UN refugee agency has entered into a number of agreements with Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran separately and jointly, for facilitating the voluntary repatriation and protection of Afghan refugees and assisting the host countries realise these objectives. In 2013, Pakistan issued a national policy on Afghan refugees. Pakistan has issued Proof of Registration (PoR) cards to Afghan refugees which allow them to remain in the country for short durations (six months to a year) though these periods are often renewed when the deadline is set to expire. The duration of the renewal is a politically charged affair where the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions and the foreign affairs ministry often find themselves on opposite sides. In January, the government extended PoR cards until June 30, 2016.
While the status quo is maintained, without peace and stability in Afghanistan there can be no long-term resolution of the refugee crisis in Pakistan anytime soon. This does not mean that Pakistan can escape its commitments under human rights and international refugee law.
Under Article 14 (1) of the UDHR, “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”. While Pakistan has not signed the convention relating to the status of refugees (1951), nor its 1967 protocol which removed the geographic and temporal limits of the 1951 convention, it is still bound by Article 33(1) of the refugee convention because the right against refoulement outlined therein has crystallised into a binding norm of customary international law. Under this “no contracting state shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”.
Last year was an extremely bloody one for Afghanistan as the Afghan Taliban achieved several battlefield successes. Pakistan is aware that the security situation next door is tenuous. It is directly involved in peace talks with the Taliban. Recently, Gen Raheel Sharif also promised full support to Kabul for peace efforts. While Pakistan has a role to play in the quest for peace in Afghanistan it must also meet its human rights obligations,
particularly by extending the protections afforded under the obligation of non-refoulement.
One can’t, however, have one’s cake and eat it too; on the one hand Pakistani officials critique the security situation in Afghanistan, blaming Kabul for not doing enough to rein in the militants, including those engaged in conflict with Pakistan’s military. On the other hand, the establishment argues that it is safe enough to repatriate the millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. This dichotomy is untenable; Pakistan must ensure that refugees under its care are extended the necessary protections afforded to them under international law.
Sikander Ahmed Shah is former legal adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Abid Rizvi is an expert on international law.
Published in Dawn, March 6th, 2016
ISLAMABAD: Efforts for reviving the reconciliation dialogue between the Afghan government and the Taliban ran into trouble on Saturday with the main faction of the insurgent group denying it planned to join the process, besides questioning its efficacy.
“We unequivocally state that the leader of Islamic Emirate has not authorised anyone to participate in this meeting,” said a statement by the Taliban, who officially call themselves ‘Islamic Emirate’ — the moniker they used during the period they ruled Afghanistan.
The statement further reiterated the conditions the group has been stating all along for entering the peace dialogue — exit of foreign forces from Afghanistan, lifting of curbs on Taliban leaders and release of Taliban prisoners from Afghan jails.
Surge in operations by Afghan forces and presence of US troops cited as reasons for the group’s decision
The insurgent group headed by Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, which issued the statement, is the dominant militant faction in the Afghan war theatre and is also recognised by the Afghan government as a ‘legitimate interlocutor’. The faction is represented by its Political Office in Doha (Qatar). Army Chief Gen Raheel Sharif last month visited Doha for enlisting support of the Qatari leadership for the initiative.
The statement ended hopes of the reconciliation negotiations commencing in the first week of this month — a timeline set by the four countries — Pakistan, Afghanistan, China and the US — participating in the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) on Afghan reconciliation.
This is the second time that QCG has missed the deadline. It had initially planned to open the talks in the last week of February.
The reconciliation dialogue with the Taliban has been suspended since July last year when it transpired ahead of the second round of the process being pursued then that the insurgent group’s leader Mullah Omar had been dead for over two years.
The factors cited by the group now for not returning to the negotiation table include intensification of operations by Afghan forces, deployment of US troops to the battlefield and their participation in air strikes and continuing night raids.
“Peace talks will be meaningless in the light of these developments,” the Taliban insist.
Continuing optimism
Despite the setback, officials engaged in preparations for the meeting that Pakistan is to host say they are still “optimistic” about the process starting very soon.
A top security official saw the statement as a pressure tactic by the Taliban and said that the entire process would not fall apart because of it.
“It is a typical pre-negotiations tactic for setting negotiation agenda. We can only hope that they move away from this stated position,” he stressed.
The QCG had last month adopted a ‘roadmap’, which lays out the various stages and timelines for the process. The official believes the delay would not disturb the roadmap.
“It is important to remember that the roadmap is not an end, only a means. It delineates the process, and there can be adjustments, improvements, retuning as we move ahead,” he said.
The immediate objective before the QCG was to get the process started before the launch of annual spring offensive by the Taliban so that violence could be lowered.
Afghanistan’s ambassador to Pakistan Hazrat Omer Zakhilwal too is hopeful that the talks would get under way soon. He was quoted by the Voice of America as saying: “There is a lot happening in the background.” He explained that the planned starting date of the first week of March was “indicative” that plans are moving forward.
Pressure on Islamabad
The Taliban’s inflexibility on dialogue can cause problems for Pakistan.
Afghanistan has long been demanding that Pakistan stop providing shelter to the Taliban. But it was the first time that the Pakistan government at the recently concluded round of Strategic Dialogue with the US accepted to not allow the Taliban to use its soil any further.
“Pakistan reaffirmed its commitment to taking action, in line with the country’s National Action Plan, to ensure that the Taliban are unable to operate from Pakistani soil,” the joint statement said.
Published in Dawn, March 6th, 2016
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